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The Internet of Things is becoming more and more popular with time. The 
extremely low cost of sensors is putting the growth of the Internet of Things on 
steroids. Many industries such as healthcare, construction, agriculture, and trans-
portation are increasingly leveraging this technology. However, security and privacy 
are two big concerns when it comes to the future of the Internet of Things. Since 
most of these “things” that are connected to the Internet are simple devices with 
limited hardware capabilities, it is nearly impossible to harden them via traditional 
resource-heavy defenses. In this chapter, we discuss the importance of securing the 
Internet of Things networks, layout the challenges of the Internet of Things secu-
rity, and briefly discuss potential solutions in the literature.
Keywords: cyber security, Privacy, Internet of Things
1. Introduction
Since the invention of the first ever network in 1972, computers are being 
connected using various topologies. Ranging from the traditional pair of wires 
found in industrial plants that connect sensors and actuators to the process 
control system, to state-of-the-art IPv6-enabled wearable sensors for medical 
monitoring, the idea is the same. You have a bunch of sensors that should talk to 
each other securely, whether on the Ethernet, Bluetooth, Zigbee, or a basic 4–20 
milliamp electric circuit. We can safely say that IoT was born after the wedding of 
Information Technology (IT) and Operation Technology (OT). In fact, Fieldbus 
technology [1], which is one of the variants that is widely adopted in the industry, 
is a direct result of the advancements in OT that is trying to make the devices in the 
field ‘smarter’. However, the challenge is how to get these variants to talk to each 
other, which requires a common ground of communication, such as the Internet 
Protocol (IP).
We can think of two types of Internet of Things (IoT) implementation, namely 
greenfield and brownfield [2]. Almost all the implementations in the fields that 
have no legacy using networked systems, such as health, agriculture, and trans-
portation, are considered as greenfield IoT implementation. On the other hand, 
a brownfield implementation is the one trying to introduce internet devices in 
conjunction with traditional networked infrastructure, such as Fieldbus technol-
ogy in the process automation industry. In both cases, a defined framework for 




On the 21st of Oct 2016, a massive Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack 
resulted in putting down the web services of famous companies such as Twitter, 
Amazon, Netflix, Airbnb, and GitHub, among others [3, 4]. The malware name was 
Mirai and it targets the DNS service provider called Dyn [5]. In the Japanese language, 
Mirai means ‘Future” [6]. In reality, what Mirai did was simply switching Linux-based 
devices into digital weapons by exploiting the vulnerabilities of IoT devices, like 
factory default settings. In this specific attack, IP cameras and Digital Video Recorders 
(DVRs) were used to launch the attack. What makes this possible is the fact that many 
manufacturers of IoT devices leave the passwords hardcoded in the firmware, allow-
ing hackers to easily connect to them using Telnet or Secure Shell (SSH).
In 2010, a specialized piece of code was developed to target nuclear plants. This 
malware was called “Stuxnet” [7]. Although the fact that most of the nuclear research 
centers employ the well-known air gap security mechanism, a poisoned Universal Serial 
Bus (USB) flash drive was used to infect the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) 
responsible for the uranium enrichment centrifuges. As a result, the centrifuges suffered 
from physical damage due to faster than usual spins for extended periods, and abnormal 
acceleration and deceleration rates. Iran was not the only country that was affected by 
the attack. Other countries, such as India and Indonesia, were affected as well.
2. Building blocks of IoT security
Most of the network protocols are designed without having security in mind. Hence, 
network security is often the aftermath. Also, the heterogeneity of network compo-
nents might be the gateway for predators to compromise the network. One way to solve 
this issue is to divide the devices in the network into two groups, trusted and untrusted 
devices. The former group is equipped with “root-of-trust” that could be as simple as 
an attestation key supplied by the manufacturer [8]. These trusted devices use secure 
communication mechanisms, namely secure key storage and cryptographic operations. 
Attestation protocols are used to assess whether untrusted devices are secure enough to 
join the trustworthiness group. The borderline between the trusted-devices group and 
the untrusted ones is usually invisible, as it is very difficult to classify these groups based 
on the type, manufacturer or even use. Moreover, the attestation process is usually 
dynamic and might change over time or in response to attacks on the network.
Root-of-trust is nothing but the set of trusted functionalities in the device that 
are assumed to be trustworthy and could never be compromised [9]. For example, 
the secure booting functionality of the device is a root-of-trust. Another example 
is the attestation functionality, which proves the validity of claims using crypto-
graphic mechanisms. In fact, an IoT device might have multiple roots-of trust.
The ecosystem to establish trustworthiness in any IoT framework is composed of 
several building blocks, as shown in Figure 1. The first and foremost is the Trusted 
Execution Environment (TEE), which is responsible for executing trusted applica-
tion codes and minimizing security risks. It is also responsible for isolating the 
process execution from other processes running on the same hardware. The second 
component is the secure communication channel, which is responsible for preserving 
the confidentiality and integrity of the data flowing between devices in the network 
using standard encryption mechanisms. The third component is the authentication 
process, including both the keys themselves, whether symmetric or asymmetric, and 
the actual key distribution and authentication protocol. The fourth component is the 
attestation process, involving the attestation key that is provided by the manufacturer, 
as well as the verification logic. After that, we must ensure that the devices are capable 
of securely storing all the keys and data gathered from the sensors. Finally, there is the 
ability to gather all relevant contextual information, such as location and time.
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3. IoT device lifecycle
When discussing IoT security, we need first to understand the various stages 
in which the IoT device is going into overtime. Figure 2 shows the typical lifecycle 
of an IoT device. It starts with the development of the software part of the IoT 
device using the Software Development Kit (SDK) or the Application Programming 
Interface (API) to hide the complexity. Then, tools are used for building the physi-
cal components of the device itself. We cannot stress enough the importance of the 
right configurations in the lifecycle of the IoT device. In this stage, various param-
eters are set in multiple components, such as the Central Processing Unit (CPU), 
the System on Chip (SoC), and the Operating System (OS). After that, it is the time 
for field deployment and making sure that the connection is established properly. 
Then, frequent updates are installed to protect the device. Finally, retirement is the 
reality that outdated devices must face.
4. End-to-end IoT security
The end-to-end concept is important when talking about the security of com-
munication networks. Figure 3 shows the main components involved in the end-to-
end security journey of IoT device communication. Typically, the IoT device will 
encrypt the data gathered from sensors and send it to the gateway. Sometimes, it 
might store this data locally after encrypting it. The gateway will decrypt the data 
and run some analytics, and then encrypt it again to share it with the cloud. The 
cloud instance will decrypt the data one more time once received and run some 
analytics before encrypting it again, so it can be stored in the Database (DB).
To increase the portability of nodes, IoT frameworks have been proposed. The 
IoT framework is a great way to hide the complexity of network topology and 
type. However, an IoT framework must be designed to support end-to-end secure 
Figure 1. 




IoT device typical lifecycle.
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communication between nodes, whether from an authentication, privacy, or 
confidentiality point-of-view. In fact, frameworks vary significantly when it comes 
to the implementation of this notion of end-to-end security [10, 11]. Some of these 
discrepancies are highlighted in Table 1.
The IoT framework is composed of three different layers: the data object layer, the 
node interaction layer, and the platform abstraction layer, also known as the con-
nectivity and hardware abstraction layer. These three layers are shown in Figure 4. 
The data object layer is responsible for physical and logical node-to-device mapping. 
Also, it is the one responsible for managing the node Access Control List (ACL). The 
second layer is responsible for inter-node communication. The end-point security 
context must be achieved in this layer. Finally, the platform layer could be further 
Figure 3. 
Components of end-to-end security in IoT.
IoT framework Security approach
Open Connectivity 
Foundation (OCF)
Tackles the security using three strategies: 1. Access control 2. Message 
encryption. 3. Device lifecycle management. Issue: (no security 
interoperability with other frameworks such as AllJoyn or UPnP)
AllSeen Alliance/AllJoyn End-to-end security in the application layer using leaf nodes.
Universal Plug and Play 
(UPnP)
Security was not in the initial design and it was added later as an optional 
service through the IoT management and control architecture.
Lightweight Machine 2 
Machine (LWM2M)
It achieves security using a secure message exchange with the Datagram 
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and an access control list using the 
bootstrap server.
One Machine to Machine 
(OneM2M)
By design, it has the capability of performing authorization, access control, 




OPC-UA is designed with security in mind. Distribute security functions 
over two layers, namely: the session layer and the secure channel layer. 
The former is the one responsible for authentication and access control, 
whereas the latter is taking care of message encryption, using Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) and HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS).
Data Distribution Service 
(DDS)
Security is achieved through three techniques: 1. Message security 
enveloping 2. Security tokens 3. Security plugin modules to add on 
services, such as authentication, access control and encryption.
Table 1. 




Layers of IoT framework.
partitioned into three sub-layers, namely: network, sensor, and actuator, as well as 
security layer. Basically, an IoT network uses the same Internet layering model. This 
allows the IP to run on top of legacy industrial IoT protocols, like Fieldbus. The only 
difference is replacing the application layer with the IoT framework layer.
5. Securing IoT nodes




To achieve IoT security effectively, we should focus on protecting the device, 
user identity, and data. We should manage the security at runtime as well. These 
points are illustrated in Figure 5.
The IoT Ecosystem is composed of the device, network, framework, and system 
management. By system management, we mean the procedure to maintain, replace 
and retire services. Also, it includes the procedures to update the firmware and 
apply security updates. In fact, requirements for system management vary a lot with 
different implementations. Obviously, brownfield and greenfield implementations 
have different system management requirements.
Let us talk about securing the IoT device itself. IoT devices are often resource 
constrained when it comes to memory space (storage), computation power, or even 
battery life. Therefore, the selection of which cryptographic algorithm to use is crucial. 
Although it is associated with high security impersonation risk, symmetric key cryp-
tography is considered the most suitable type for IoT use. This is because it requires a 
small memory size and literally no hardware acceleration. Moreover, it is considered 
post-quantum safe given that the key size is increased from 128 to 256 bits [12].
7
Internet of Things Security and Privacy
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.96669
Device Identity Composition Engine (DICE) [13, 14] is a secure IoT initiative pro-
posed by Trusted Computing Group (TCG). It tackles the issues of secure booting 
and attestation without the need of a dedicated co-processor. DICE uses a hardware- 
based unique number generated among the device’s boot called Unique Device Secret 
(UDS). The device identifier is nothing but the result of hashing the UDS with the 
device firmware. Thus, any modification to the firmware will result in a different 
device identifier, which will mark the device as ‘untrusted’ in the network.
6. Hardware and firmware security in IoT
Figure 6 shows the number of hardware and firmware security vulnerabilities in 
the past 20 years [15]. It is very clear that the number is on the rise and it should get 
the community’s attention.
To achieve hardware-based security in IoT networks, we need to make sure that 





Intel has utilized available hardware-based technologies to achieve secure IoT 
networks, as illustrated in Figure 7. In the following paragraphs, we explain these 
technologies briefly:
6.1 Intel trusted execution technology (TXT)
TXT [16] is nothing but a set of hardware extensions to allow advanced security 
features, such as the measured launch environment and protected execution. TXT 
allows the user to run a specific program in an isolated space, protecting it from 
Figure 5. 
Technologies involved in securing IoT devices.
Internet of Things
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other software in the system. For this reason, it improves the trust in the applica-
tion’s execution environment. As a result, important data can be protected from 
adversaries running malicious code on the same platform.
6.2 Intel QuickAssist technology (QAT)
This technology supports crypto-acceleration and compression-acceleration in the 
hardware level. By offloading the security-related computation to a special adapter, 
the system can utilize its CPU computation power in something else [17]. For exam-
ple, wireless security and routing algorithms can surely benefit from this technology.
Figure 6. 
Statistics of hardware and firmware vulnerabilities for the past 20 years.
Figure 7. 
Intel approach to achieve IoT security.
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6.3 Intel platform trust technology (PTT)
This technology is very much related to an older technology called TPM (Trusted 
Platform Module). The main idea is to store keys in protected chips to authenticate 
hardware and software components. You can think of it as a digital fingerprint to the 
machine that is set by the manufacturer. PTT [18, 19] is implemented in the firmware 
to allow even low cost, low power devices like tablets to benefit from this technology.
6.4 Intel software guard extension (SGX)
Data can still be vulnerable while it is being stored or executed. SGX is a technol-
ogy that fosters the isolation of process execution and memory allocation [20]. It 
empowers user-level code to have its own regions in the memory, called enclaves. 
These enclaves do not grant access to other processes with higher privileges. SGX 
basically strengthens the defenses by reducing the system’s attack surface.
7. OS security in IoT
An operating system is considered the vehicle to control hardware through soft-
ware. It is the lowest level software in the system hierarchy. OS security takes care of 
several tasks, such as separate execution and memory allocation, secret storage, and 
avoidance of programming errors.
The selection of the best operating system to use in IoT environments depends 
on several factors, like the system type, computing power, and threat level. IoT 
devices usually have limited power and computation capabilities resulting in limited 
choices of CPUs. Hence, OS security will be working on a best effort approach. 
Zephyr OS [21] is an open-source real time operating system that is specifically 
designed for resource constrained systems. It is unique in a sense that it was 
designed with security in mind. Consequently, it supports separate thread execu-
tion as well as separate memory storage. Moreover, it defines two levels of authority, 
which are the user level and the supervisor level. However, it lacks a proper authori-
zation mechanism, which is a serious weakness [11].
As shown in Tables 2, 80% of the top ten products with the highest number 
of distinct vulnerabilities reported in the past 20 years are found to be operating 
# Product name Vendor name Product type # of vulnerabilities
1 Debian Linux Debian OS 3067
2 Android Google OS 2563
3 Linux Kernel Linux OS 2357
4 Mac OS X Apple OS 2212
5 Ubuntu Linux Canonical OS 2007
6 Firefox Mozilla Application 1873
7 Chrome Google Application 1858
8 IOS Apple OS 1655
9 Windows Server 2008 Microsoft OS 1421
10 Windows 7 Microsoft OS 1283
Table 2. 




Mechanisms used to compromise operating systems of IoT devices.
systems [22]. These statistics are not surprising because OS allows the attackers 
to access almost any part of the system with high privileges. Attackers use differ-
ent ways to compromise the operating system. Some of these methods are shown 
in Figure 8. A rootkit is a good example of malware that uses these techniques to 
penetrate the OS and take over some of its tasks.
8. IoT network security
Most of the things in IoT will be connected wirelessly. Actually, there are 
many technologies available nowadays for connecting devices wirelessly, some 
of them belongs to Personal Area Networks (PANs), and some to Wireless Local 
Area Networks (WLANs) and Wide Area Networks (WANs). When talking about 
security in wireless networks, there are two aspects that must be considered. First, it 
is important to secure the data in transit using encryption mechanisms. Otherwise, 
anyone will have access to the data since air is a shared medium. The second one is 
the security of the wireless devices themselves, such as routers and access points. 
Unauthorized access to these devices might allow the attackers to reconfigure the 
network or forward the traffic to unwanted destinations.
Ethernet Time-Sensitive Networking (TSN) is state-of-the-art technology 
in industrial IoT that promises to bridge the gap between IT and OT [23]. Being 
vendor agnostic is a great feature of TSN and allows a large degree of interoperabil-
ity. Furthermore, building it on top of Ethernet allowed a seamless interaction with 
non-TSN network devices in a plug and play fashion. Moreover, critical and non-
critical traffic can co-exist with no worry about the potential increase in latency, 
thanks to the use of tight-time synchronization methods. Another important 
feature that allows the coexistence of the high and low priority traffic in the same 
network is Traffic Scheduling. In fact, TSN uses the notion of multiple queues to 
store packets with different priorities. TSN implements redundancy on the packet 
level by transmitting two duplicate packets through two different routes in the 
network. The one that arrives earlier will be processed whereas the other is simply 
discarded. This is a great way of assuring reliability in industrial-based networks. 
Finally, it is important to note that it is possible to use TCN as a link-layer protocol 
in any framework. OPC-UA is an example of such a case [24].
9. Conclusion
Security and privacy are important aspects of IoT networks. Given the wide-
spread use of IoT devices in many fields, keeping the network secure is becoming 
increasingly important. Similarly, preserving data integrity is essential, especially 
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when IoT sensors are used in the medical field. In this chapter, we have encouraged 
and supported the need for IoT security and privacy by giving examples of past 
attacks on IoT networks. Then, we described in detail the building blocks of IoT 
trustworthiness to illustrate the challenges facing IoT system engineers. After that, 
we explained the typical lifecycle of an IoT device, starting from the development 
phase until the device is retired. Moreover, we introduced the concept of end-
to-end security in IoT networks. Also, we compared seven different approaches 
for securing IoT platforms and highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each 
approach. Finally, we briefly presented challenges and potential solutions for secur-
ing IoT from the OS, hardware, network, and from a device point-of-view. The Intel 






IoT Internet of Things
DDOS  Distributed Denial of Service
DVR Digital Video Recorder
SSH Secure Shell
USB  Universal Serial Bus
PLC Programmable Logic Controller
Section 2
TEE Trusted Execution Environment
Section 3
SDK  Software Development Kit
API  Application Programming Interface
CPU  Central Processing Unit
SoC System on Chip
OS  Operating System
Section 4
DB Database
OCF  Open Connectivity Foundation
UPnP Universal Plug and Play
LWM2M  Lightweight Machine 2 Machine
DTLS Datagram Transport Layer Security
OneM2M  One Machine to Machine
OPC-UA  Open Platform Communications-Unified Architecture
TLS Transport Layer Security
HTTPS HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure
DDS  Data Distribution Service
ACL  Access Control List
Section 5
DICE  Device Identity Composition Engine
TCG Trusted Computing Group
UDS  Unique Device Secret
Section 6
TXT  Trusted Execution Technology
QAT  QuickAssist Technology
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